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The Paradox of Plenty: Why Guyana’s Local
Content Law Needs a Reality Check
By: Dr. Vivian M. Williams, Esq.
In October 2022, the Guyana Business Journal (GBJ) challenged a panel of experts to deliberate on how
Guyana could maximize local capture from its oil and gas sector. The question is pregnant with
possibilities. However, Guyana, like other developing countries before it, assumes that a local content law
is the secret sauce. Therefore, the discourse focuses on implementing coercive local content
requirements (LCRs). Omitted from consideration is whether a local content law is even necessary.
Coercive local content requirements did not live up to the hype in countries that relied on themi.
Additionally, Guyana is different from countries that implement aggressive local content requirements.
Those countries share three distinct features. They are less integrated in the global economy; have a wide
array of suppliers; and a large labor force. With fewer than a million people and an infant manufacturing
sector, Guyana lacks a robust array of suppliers and labor force. Moreover, isolationism would be suicidal
given its reliance on allies.
Further, Guyana lacks five factors that decades of research found are necessary for effective LCRs
implementationii. These factors are:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Large Market size and stability
The right level of local content requirements
Cooperation and financial incentives
Potential for knowledge transfer
Technology

Essentially, Guyana, now the world’s fastest growing economy, is an anomaly. It is extremely small, lacks
technological sophistication and has low potential for knowledge transfer. The potential for knowledge
transfer is less when the knowledge gap between local and foreign firms is wide. Particularly, knowledge
transfer is slower when LCRs mandate a high level of managerial control by localsiii. Guyana has set
managerial control by locals at 75%. Additionally, it requires 51% local ownership of firms and 90% of the
employees to be locals. More than half of the 40 sectors the law applies to require 70% or more local
content.

3 Obstacles to Effective Local Content in Guyana
1. Limited Supply of Local Content
A law that mandates the use of scarce products and services, will create more problems than solutions.
Therefore, local content requirements cannot exceed the available supply. In the short run, the supply
problem could be solved if firms have excess capacity to respond to a sudden increase in demand.

Guyanese firms do not have excess capacity and the level of supply needed to satisfy demand created by
the new oil and gas sector. This includes relevant skills, products, and services. Apart from a shortage in
total units of the various products and services, individual suppliers operate on a very small scale. While
local firms operate on a small scale, oil and gas procurements are bundled in large orders. This means
products and services are not produced in sufficient quantities to satisfy purchase orders.
The benefits from large scale procurement are (a) effective supply chain management; and (b) efficiency
gains from economies of scale. Therefore, any mandate that oil companies break up procurement orders
into smaller bundles to facilitate micro enterprises will create inefficiencies.
Small firms will either be excluded from the oil and gas sector or will have to scale their operations.
However, there are impediments to scalability. Local firms do not have excess capacity to scale
production. If they reposition and reallocate assets from the non-oil sector, they would be heading down
the road to the Dutch Disease.

2. Inadequate Structure, Size and Culture of Local Firms
To avoid the Dutch Disease, Guyana pins its hope for local content success on local firms building nonexistent capacity rapidly. However, capacity building also faces major constraints. First, decades of
massive brain-drain left the country depleted of human capital. The government and the private sector
estimate that labor supply would need to increase by approximately 150,000 to satisfy demand created
by the oil boom.
Another limitation is unavailability of the capital needed for expansion in the country. This means the
country must look outward to build the capacity it needs. Partnering with foreign firms is necessary.
Therefore, an important question is whether the local content law furthers or hinders this partnership.
Basic common sense would tell us that foreign firms will not contribute 80% of the capital needed to
build the required capacity and accept 49% ownership of a firm. Common sense would also tell us that
foreign firms cannot contribute to rapid knowledge and technology transfer in firms where locals have
75% managerial control.
Andrew Schnitzer, one of the Guyana Business Journal’s panelists, underscores the importance of trust. If
foreign firms do not trust local firms to perform at an adequate level of efficiency, they may stay out of
the market completely. Qiu and Taoiv have found evidence of this in their study of countries that have
coercive local content requirements. They found that LCRs (a) generate less foreign direct investment
(FDI) than market forces; and (b) attract inefficient firms to the host country.
Therefore, to succeed, Guyana must create an environment of trust to foster partnerships between local
firms that lack capacity and foreign firms that have capacity. Trust is built by easing into local content.
Such an incremental approach would result in gains without market distortions. Perhaps, to drum up
political sentiments, Guyana has plunged into local content with aggressive requirements. However, the
ambitious local content requirements need a strong institutional framework to be effective.

3. Weak Institutions and Enforcement Capacity
Guyana has very weak institutions. It therefore faces enormous difficulties enforcing basic laws,
regulations, and rules. Even institutions that have decades of experience and appear to be robust, fail in

high stakes matters. The local content law is a new legal regime that is particularly fragile and lacks the
wisdom that comes from experience. Yet, it has been tasked with matters of the highest stake.
Several problems arise from weak institutions. First, the marginal success obtained are for low-level
infractions. However, the system crumbles in high stakes matters. Consequently, the impact is largely felt
by the poor and powerless. Weak institutions tend not to succeed in enforcement against the rich and
powerful. They therefore create imbalances that increase inequality.
Developing countries like Guyana cannot go forward merely speaking of the rule of law as compliance
with existing laws. Where existing legal structures create fertile ground for discrimination and inequality
the rule of law is either failing or absent. It is for that reason that this generation is still grappling with the
failings of the rule of law from centuries ago. The lesson from history is that the rule of law must be
measured against the quality of law.
Countries with weak institutional structures have taught us that local content laws have the following
effects:
a. increases corruption
b. distribution of benefits to the politically connected
c. weakens enforcement against the rich and politically connected
Therefore, in countries with weak institutions, local content laws inflame political and social tension and
widen the gap between the rich and the poor. Consequently, contentions of adherence to the rule of law
must be tempered by consideration of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

The imperative of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
The movement towards diversity, equity, and inclusion has not gained traction in developing countries
where it is most needed. Plural and tribal societies that are built on ethnic dominance, have shunned
diversity, equity, and inclusion. The inclination in these societies is to preserve the infrastructure for
ethnic dominance though it is a blight to progress.
One of local content’s dark side effects is it contribution to the infrastructure for ethnic and political
dominance. Guyana presents both the context and the mechanism for dark side effects. It is a plural
society that is split along racial lines. Ethnic insecurities and tension are high. Additionally, the
Constitution, institutions, and political culture provide for a winner-take-all system. Because the two
major political parties are ethnically based, winner-take-all gives rise to ethnic domination.
A movement towards diversity, equity, and inclusion would ease ethnic suspicion and tension while
strengthening cohesiveness. Government should therefore lead the movement towards diversity, equity,
and inclusion. This problem may not be solved simply by grouping companies into ethnic classifications
and then distribute benefits based on ethnic classification. Instead, the government should push local
firms to be more diverse, equitable and inclusive.
The government should use it dominance in public procurement and private procurement - through local
content requirements, to impose diversity, equity, and inclusion measures on companies. The gravity of
the inequities means that economic factors should not be the only procurement considerations. To avoid
the paradox of plenty, there must be a social and political component.

Reality Check
Policy makers in Guyana have adopted the approach that presents local content as a necessary and
supreme option. Perhaps, embedded in the assumption of the supremacy of coercive local content
requirements is a folly that triggers the paradox of plenty – an irrational sense of self.
The challenge for Guyana is to be true to itself. In doing so it will find three fundamental pillars of change
that are necessary for successful implementation of local content requirements. The three pillars of
change are (a) local firm structure; (b) local firm size; and (c) local firm culture. The first two pillars of
change are necessary to produce greater efficiency and capacity. The third pillar is needed for diversity,
equity, and inclusion. Here is where some sage advice is provided by the panelists who gathers at GBJ
roundtable.
The sobering tone of the GBJ roundtable is that change will not be overnight. This is the lesson, decades
of experience from dozens of countries have taught us. Forebearers of coercive local content are now
waking up from their delusion with shattered dreams. One of the questions that has come back to haunt
is – was coercive local content requirements even necessary? Guyana should confront that question
before leaning too heavily on local content laws. It could learn from the collective experiences of other
countries or bury its head in the sand and pray that it avoids the resource curse.
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